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 Figure 1: The Nile Basin1 
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I. Introduction 
The Egyptian people have monopolized the water of the Nile River for more than 
5000 years.  Greek historian Herodotus famously referred to Egypt as the ‘gift of the 
river’ as its civilization grew and prospered on the Nile’s fertile banks.3 Unchallenged 
access to the Nile allowed Egypt to emerge as the ‘breadbasket of the Roman Empire’ 
and has been a driving factor in its historic regional hegemony.4 In the late nineteenth 
century, Great Britain came to be the colonial power in the region, controlling both Egypt 
and its contiguous upstream neighbor, Sudan. The British sought to guarantee that these 
countries, particularly Egypt, had unchallenged access to the Nile’s discharge to maintain 
their significant agricultural exports.5 This exclusivity was finally recorded in a 1929 
agreement between the two countries that gave Egypt the right to utilize 48 billion cubic 
meters (bcm) and Sudan the right to 4 bcm of the assumed total flow of 52 bcm.6  More 
importantly, the entire flow of the Nile during the dry season was to be reserved for 
Egypt; it would also have veto power over any upstream development projects. 
 After the construction of the Aswan High Dam (AHD) during the Cold War, the 
amount of water that could be captured increased and a new, post-colonial agreement 
between Egypt and Sudan was signed in 1959. This allocated 55.5 bcm for Egypt and 
15.5 bcm for Sudan, with an assumed 10 bcm lost to evaporation from Lake Nasser, the 
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dam’s reservoir.7  There were no other signatories to this 1959 agreement as most of the 
other riparian states were still under colonial rule. In effect, a prevailing status quo was 
established which disregarded the rights of upstream nations and people to develop their 
share of the Nile in a way that might harm Egypt’s determined water allocation.  
Until recently, the rights set forth by the 1959 agreement provided Egypt with a 
surplus of water to provide for its relatively small population and to irrigate its farms. The 
Egyptian economy and population became heavily dependent on the growth and export of 
agricultural products fed by the Nile’s waters; the country currently utilizes between 80-
85 percent of their allocation of the Nile’s water for irrigation purposes. However, this 
surplus has gradually dwindled. Fifty years ago the country had 2,100 cubic meters of 
water per person, which was well over the 1000 cubic meter per person water ‘poverty 
line’ as outlined by the United Nations.8  Today, the average water allowance in Egypt is 
less than 800 cubic meters per person.9  This precipitous drop is largely due to the 
significant increase in Egypt’s population from about 26 million in 1960 to over 83 
million today with a projection of 114.8 million before its stabilizes in 2065.10. The 
historical access to excess water has led to an inefficient water irrigation system, a 
bloated and ineffective water bureaucracy, unwise strategic efforts to irrigate desert land, 
and other egregious and wasteful policies. It is widely recognized that Egypt is in the 
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midst of a water crisis.  Riots and headlines about water shortages are rife in today’s 
newspapers.   
The sustainability of these internal inefficiencies and the ensuing wastage had not 
been threatened until recently; however, there are now mounting signs that the status quo 
has begun to unravel. Egypt faces dwindling regional power resulting from the fall of the 
Mubarak regime and increasing pressure from upstream riparian states, or the countries 
bordering the river, to develop an equitable water-sharing agreement.  In 2010, six 
upstream nations signed the Entebbe Treaty, which asserted that they would no longer 
ask Egypt’s permission to divert water for their own use.  Not surprisingly, Egypt, Sudan 
and South Sudan, which gained independence in 2011, are not signatories. Ethiopia, 
which contributes significantly more water to the river’s annual flow than any other 
country, has emerged as the most vocal proponent of capitalizing on its national right to 
use the Nile’s waters. In April 2011, Ethiopia announced plans to construct the $5 billion 
Grand Renaissance Dam (GRD), which will be the largest hydroelectric power generator 
in Africa and create one of Africa’s largest reservoirs; it will also significantly reduce the 
flow of water reaching Egypt’s borders. 11 
Although Egypt is the riparian state most dependent on the waters of the Nile, 
Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in the world. Egypt will not be able to stop the 
construction of the GRD using its typical methods of political and military coercion, and 
Ethiopia’s population could greatly benefit from the export of hydroelectric power and 
the increased food security that would result from the irrigation of underutilized arable 
land. Ethiopia will pursue the construction of the Grand Renaissance Dam and Egypt 
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must take action to prepare for this certain reduction in its water supply. Egypt faces 
immense economic and political challenges to provide for its growing population in the 
face of decreasing food security, urban crowding and climate change. The current 
inefficient use of water is arguably the most crucial environmental and development 
problem in Egypt.12   
This paper will discuss water rights diplomacy in the Nile Basin, the roots of the 
water crisis in Egypt and the capability of upstream riparian states, particularly Ethiopia, 
to utilize their share of the Nile.  It will propose alternatives solutions to remedy the 
conflicting claims to the Nile water without a regional devolution into war.  Current 
water use trends in Egypt will be outlined including an analysis of supply and demand 
issues, distributional and institutional failures, and property rights problems that have led 
to an inefficient use of water. Other water use policies will be discussed including 
inefficiencies in the existing infrastructure, cropping patterns, evaporation, etc.   
This paper will argue that the likelihood of a regional clash over water will be 
significantly reduced if Egypt reforms its water management and irrigation policies to 
yield greater water usage efficiencies and savings, thus avoiding a shortage when 
upstream development projects are implemented. The analysis of the Egyptian agriculture 
and irrigation sectors will conclude with a recommendation for a reform emphasizing the 
transfer of water management control to a more localized level. It will be essential to 
learn lessons from Mexico’s implementation of the most successful irrigation reform in 
the world by delegating power to Water Users Associations (WUAs). These community-
based groups create effective incentives, largely through the creation of an efficient 
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economic market for the resource, for local farmers to adopt water saving tactics. Similar 
to Egypt, the Mexican government agency in charge of water distribution and pricing was 
extremely centralized and exhibited rent-seeking behavior, thereby lacked the 
institutional capacity to implement water saving policies. This case will be examined and 
analyzed as an approach that could be utilized by the Egyptian government to implement 
policy that reflects the need for sustainable water use, efficiency and conservation. It 
appears that with successful reform, as illustrated by the Mexican case, water wastage 
will be decreased and the efficiency of the irrigation sector will be significantly increased 
from the current operating levels.   
 
II. The Geography of the Nile Basin 
  The Nile is the world’s longest river measuring 4,200 miles from its source in 
Tanzania to its mouth along Egypt’s Mediterranean coast.13 The Nile flows from south to 
north and travels through the borders of Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo,  (DRC), Rwanda, Eritrea, Burundi, South Sudan, Sudan and Egypt 
– the most downstream state. About 85 percent of the Nile’s waters originate in Ethiopia’s 
tributaries, the Blue Nile and the Atbara, whose discharge is only accessible to the 
downstream countries. The other 15 percent of the water comes from the White Nile 
which originates in Burundi. The Blue Nile meets the White Nile in Khartoum, Sudan; 
they converge with the Atbara shortly thereafter. But despite its significant contribution to 
the discharge of the River, Ethiopia’s use of the river has been negligible due to Egyptian 
hegemony and internal strife. Ethiopia is the upstream country that could benefit most 
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from increased access to these resources due to low levels of development, the 
underutilization of arable land and enormous hydroelectric potential.  Egypt is the riparian 
state that is most dependent on the Nile as 97 percent of its water comes from the river; 
the other 3 percent comes from ground water, recycled water and rain water. Additionally, 
around 75 million of the Egypt’s 80 million people live in the delta and river valley.14 The 
water dependence situation is similar in Sudan; however, Sudan’s agriculture sector is less 
developed and therefore requires less water. This dependence is a stark contrast from some 
upstream countries, such as the DRC, for which the Nile is a minuscule part of their water 
resources. Most of the upstream countries lie in the ‘Great Lakes Region’ where the 
rainfall contributes substantially to water resources. The total population of the Nile Basin 
countries is 300 million of which 100 million live on less than $1 day.15 With the 
exception of Egypt and Kenya, the other nine Nile Basin countries are classified as ‘least-
developed’ by the United Nations.16 The size of the Basin population is expected to 
balloon in the coming decades; it is predicted that the populations of Ethiopia, Sudan and 
Egypt alone will reach 340 million by 2050.17 
 
III. Egypt’s Hegemony with Respect to Water Rights  
  For the past 5000 years, the Egyptians have been the regional hegemon and have 
enjoyed unchallenged access to the Nile. Though Egyptians have always utilized the 
Nile’s fertile basin for agricultural purposes, the country’s productivity, specifically in the 
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cotton industry, significantly increased under British colonial rule. This was due to their 
investment in water storage, including the first Aswan Dam, and transportation 
infrastructure to facilitate the export of agricultural products.18 During this period, the 
British also began to cultivate small industries in Sudan. In 1929, in order to solidify the 
water rights of these two countries, the British signed a water-sharing agreement between 
the two countries at a ratio of 12:1 favoring Egypt.19  
  In 1952, at the beginning of the Cold War, the Soviet Union financed Egypt’s 
AHD, making it the first significant development project on the river and considerably 
increasing the amount of discharge captured. In response to this power play, Ethiopia’s 
Emperor Hailie Selassie commissioned the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation to implement a 
survey on the irrigation and hydropower potential on its share of the Blue Nile before it 
reached Egypt’s borders. The resulting report identified twenty areas with potential to 
produce hydro-electric power and five million acres of arable land whose utilization 
would require 6% of the Nile’s water before it reached Egypt’s borders.20 As John 
Waterbury writes, “Egypt may have its Soviet-financed dam, but Ethiopia has Egypt’s 
water.”21 Despite the clear potential for its own development, the culmination of this 
analysis was the construction of a single dam in Ethiopia in 1972; further construction was 
halted due to internal stride.22  
In 1959, in order to solidify their respective historic rights to the water, a treaty 
entitled “Agreement for the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters” was signed between 
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Sudan and Egypt to divide this additional water. The AHD allowed for the complete 
exploitation of the Nile and increased the annual discharge by 32 bcm from the 1929 
estimate. This increase was allocated at a 2:1 ratio between Egypt and Sudan.23 Despite 
the fact that Ethiopia was no longer under Italian rule, it was not included in negotiations. 
The agreement vaguely addressed the potential threat of upstream riparians and indicated 
that Sudan and Egypt should jointly decide on a response to threatening development 
projects.24 This new agreement defined water-sharing in absolute terms; John Waterbury 
writes, “it constructed a classic zero-sum situation; ceteris paribus, any gain in water to 
an upstream riparian must be a loss to Egypt and the Sudan.”25 The control of the Nile by 
Egypt and Sudan is unique in comparison to other riparian arrangements as it gives 
complete control of the water to the downstream states; typically upstream countries 
control the resource and develop their portion of the river at the expense of downstream 
countries.26  
Until recently, Egypt did not face any direct threats to the rights set forth by the 
1959 treaty. As Waterbury et al. point outs, this arrangement was not contested by 
upstream riparians due to “Cold War rivalries, their own political instability combined 
with bouts of civil war, and their feeble economies did not allow… [them] to press any 
realistic claim to Nile Water arising in or traversing their territories.”27 For example, in 
1974, a coupe in Ethiopia brought to power Colonel Mengistu Meriam who allied with 
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the Soviets; at the same time, Egyptian leader Anwar Sadat began to ally with Western 
forces. Ethiopia lost the Western support and funding to develop their portion of the river 
based on the outcome of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation survey.28 Additionally, Ethiopia 
went to war with Somalia and internal civil war with Eritrean rebels; there was also 
severe economic crisis in Sudan. This gave Egypt unchallenged access to the Nile’s water 
for the foreseeable future; as Waterbury point out, the only constraints were “those 
created by its own profligate use of water in its existing agriculture system.”29   
 Waterbury points to Egypt’s vested interest in the destabilization of its upstream 
neighbors as exemplified by their support of the National Islamic Front in Sudan. 30  
Waterbury points out that as long as they are in power, “the Sudan will be an ‘outlaw’ 
state, cut off from the international credits that would allow it to press ahead with its 
hydraulic plans.”31 Additionally, Egypt has enjoyed significant influence in bi- and multi-
lateral donor agencies.32 For example, Egypt was able to block funding for upstream 
development projects in the African Development Bank; additionally, the United States 
used its clout in the IMF and World Bank to deny funding to upstream development 
projects that would challenge Egypt’s access to the Nile. This control prevented the 
economically weak and conflict-ridden upstream countries from undertaking projects 
without Egypt’s specific consent or by clearly demonstrating that the project would cause 
Egypt no harm.33   
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 Egypt has shown that the defense of the 1959 treaty is its principal objective. 
Waterbury writes that Egypt has “maintained great institutional continuity in its water 
sector [and],... has patiently cultivated the international arena and donor community for 
acquiescence to, if not support for, its priorities”34 This is in clear contrast to upstream 
nations that, as Waterbury observes, “have not had consistent objectives, have constantly 
remade their institutions in an overall context of political turmoil and periodic purges, 
and they have little institutional or expert memory.”35 Despite a rightful claim to a share 
of the Nile’s waters, upstream states have been unable to organize and collectively 
bargain for an new, more equitable arrangement. Furthermore, Egypt’s willingness to use 
their highly sophisticated and internationally financed military to respond to any 
upstream threat also deterred development projects. The government has been extremely 
blunt about its willingness to defend its water rights. Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat, 
famously declared that “the only matter that could take Egypt to war again is water.”36 
This combination of factors prevented upstream riparians from embarking on 
development projects that could harm Egypt’s share of the Nile for the majority of the 
20th century. 
 
IV. Regional Challenges to the Status Quo  
 This section will examine recent challenges to the status quo brought about by the 
increasing relative strength of upstream riparian nations and the simultaneous decrease in 
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the geo-political strength of Egypt. This will include a discussion of the recent attempts 
to come to an agreement over equitable water-sharing policy in light of the population 
growth, increasing food shortages in the region and international attempts to develop the 
region for food growth. Ethiopia’s vulnerabilities and development potential will also be 
discussed. Finally, the regional power dynamic after the Arab Spring will be analyzed 
with specific attention paid to the implications of the Grand Renaissance Dam and 
potential Egyptian responses.  
 
A. Nile Basin Initiative 
 The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) was created in 1999, and marked the first time 
that all ten riparian states have come together to discuss the future of water-sharing on the 
Nile. The proclaimed mission of the NBI is to “achieve sustainable socio-economic 
development through the equitable utilization of, and benefit from, the common Nile 
Basin water resources.”37 The organization had hoped to achieve this goal through the 
negotiation of a new, comprehensive and inclusive water-sharing agreement.  
For thirteen years, the countries of the NBI have been locked in a stalemate and 
have been unable to agree on a new arrangement. As the historic regional hegemon and 
nation that is most dependent on the Nile, Egypt has no intention of ceding additional 
water resources to upstream states. However, the other riparian states argue that the 1959 
agreement is a ‘colonial relic’ and non-binding due to the fact that every other upstream 
state, with the exception of Ethiopia, was under colonial rule when the treaty was 
                                                          
37
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signed.38 This belief led Ethiopia, Rwanda, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania to sign a water-
sharing treaty called the Entebbe Agreement without unanimous riparian support. This 
agreement aligns with other trans-boundary river treaties in that it prevents nations from 
using water in a way that would be harmful to downstream countries; conversely, 
however, these upstream nations pledged to disregard Egypt’s veto-power over upstream 
development projects.39 The Egyptian government reacted to this new treaty, as Pearce 
writes, “by going on a high-level diplomatic offensive with offers of aid, backed up by 
threats of legal action if its current water ‘rights’ are not upheld.”40 Interestingly, Burundi 
had initially refrained from signing the agreement at the urging of Mubarak, but reneged 
on its promise only weeks after the fall of his regime confident that there would be no 
retaliation from the fledgling transitional government. The Democratic Republic of the 
Congo has remained neutral and Eritrea only has observed status in the NBI due to its 
position in the river’s watershed. Unsurprisingly, this treaty is opposed by Egypt, Sudan 
and South Sudan.  
 
B. Growing Regional Demand 
 There are a number of modern issues that will further complicate the future of 
water sharing. Over the next 40 years, the population of the Nile Basin countries is 
                                                          
38
 Lupei, Jacob. "Jonglei Project in Southern Sudan: For Whose Benefit Is It?" Sudan Tribune. N.p., 26 
May 2007. Web. 01 Dec. 2012. <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article22060>. 
39
 Lamere, Carolyn. "Nile Basin at a Turning Point as Political Changes Roil Balance of Power and 
Competing Demands Proliferate." New Security Beat. N.p., 4 Sept. 2012. Web. 01 Dec. 2012. 
<http://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2012/09/nile-basin-turning-point-egyptian-revolution-roils-balance-
power-competing-demands-proliferate/>. 
40
 Pearce, "Does Egypt Own The Nile? A Battle Over Precious Water." 
13 
 
expected to increase from 429 million people in 2012 to 945 million people.41 According 
to experts at Egypt’s Planning Institute, the country will need 50 percent more of the 
Nile’s water by 2050 to provide for its growing population.42 Previously, the 
development potential of the upstream countries has been limited by insufficient energy 
and funds; some countries in the region are currently experiencing rapid economic 
growth which will allow them to independently pursue development projects which had 
not previously been plausible. For example, Ethiopia’s economy is growing at 7.5 percent 
per year, Tanzania’s growth is 6.4 percent and Rwanda’s growth is 8.6 percent.43 Lamere 
writes, “growing populations require more water, but so does growing affluence.”44 
Egypt’s regional economic dominance is still evident given its relative economic strength 
versus the other downstream countries. Egypt’s GDP is $231.9 billion while Ethiopia’s 
GDP is $31.2 billion, South Sudan’s GDP is $17.19 billion and Sudan’s is $62.9 billion.45 
However, based on current trends, this gap will significantly shrink in coming decades. 
 
C. Ethiopian Vulnerabilities and Development Potential 
 Despite their willingness to challenge the status quo, Ethiopia is one of the least 
developed countries in the world. Ethiopia has a per capita GDP of $1100 compared to 
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Egypt’s $6600.46 Additionally, only 17 percent of the country’s population has access to 
potable water; this percentage will only decrease as the population of the country is 
growing at the fifth fastest rate in the world.47 The country is divided into highlands 
(above 1500 ft) and lowlands. The highlands are most suitable for rain-fed agriculture but 
are wracked by over population and highly degraded due to deforestation, overgrazing, 
soil erosion.48 The lowlands are semi-arid and present significant potential for large-scale 
irrigation initiatives. Ethiopia has an estimated 2.3 million hectares of which less than 1 
percent had been developed.49 Despite this potential, Ethiopia only uses 1 percent of Nile 
Water and shortages of rainfall have caused widespread drought and famine.50 Given its 
frequent and drastic shortfalls of food production, the country is serious about achieving 
self-sufficiency in food production ‘at any cost.’51 
 Ethiopia has attempted to construct hundreds of small microdams, which are 
small-scale irrigation projects that can provide water for a few hundred hectares. While 
this infrastructure does not require international financing and is militarily invulnerable, 
these dams have numerous problems including the buildup of silt and the ensuing 
reduction in water storage capacity, and increased instances of malaria in local 
communities.52 Additionally, construction attempts have been halted or abandoned due to 
geological challenges resulting in high percentages of lost investment capital. These local 
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attempts to increase irrigation in the lowlands have failed in most places and further 
demonstrate the need for large-scale development. 
 A 1997 World Bank study reported that “the waters of the Nile probably 
constitute Ethiopia’s greatest natural asset for development… the development of the 
River Nile has the potential to contribute significantly to poverty reduction, meet 
domestic power and food demands, and become a cornerstone of a future Ethiopian 
export strategy.”53 Despite widespread poverty, Ethiopia’s economy grew rapidly last 
year (2011); however, the Ethiopian economy is largely undiversified as 41 percent of 
their GDP comes from agriculture. Sustained economic growth will require expansion 
into other industries.54  While Egypt has natural gas and Sudan has oil, upstream 
countries have fewer energy options.55 Ethiopia’s installed capacity of hydropower dams 
is 3 percent of its potential and the economic rates of return on these projects are among 
the highest in the world.5657 According to Waterbury et al., “if Ethiopia continues to 
liberalize its economy and is politically stable, it may be anticipated that funds will be 
available from a variety of sources to finance… other larger water resources development 
projects in the Blue Nile watershed.”58 Development projects on the Nile could give 
Ethiopia the option to export excess hydroelectric power to upstream countries due to its 
own low per capita energy consumption. This could substantially add to the country’s 
low GDP, diversify economic activity and provide cheap power to rural households. Nile 
development projects could also facilitate the irrigation of additional land, which could 
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help the country increase its food security. As of now, rain-fed agriculture has been 
unable to meet the food requirements of the population.59 The failure to utilize this 
resource in light of population projections, and economic and environmental degradation 
will only serve to plunge Ethiopia’s population into greater poverty. 
 
D. International Development Pressures and Agricultural Potential in East Africa 
 There will be further stress on water resources in the region as 16.9 million 
hectares in East Africa, principally Ethiopia and Uganda were sold or leased to foreign 
investors after the 2008 food crisis. Countries such as Saudi Arabia, India and the United 
Arab Emirates are countries that need to import food to meet the demands of their 
population due to insufficient agricultural conditions. Agribusiness companies in India 
plan to spend $2.5 billion to buy or rent land in Ethiopia and Uganda. They are able to the 
rent the land for around $1.50/year per hectare for contracts up to 100 years making it 
some of the cheapest land in the world.60 Much of this land will be used to grow palm oil, 
cereal and sugarcane – one of the most water intensive crops.61 The poor governments of 
these East African countries have welcomed companies heralding this foreign direct 
investment for its potential to create employment in the region. In reality, the government 
has been handing out subsidies and tax exemptions to these companies at the expense of 
local communities; thousands of local residents are facing eviction, pastoralist farmers 
are being excluded from land they have historically used for grazing and much of this 
land will be used to grow food for export further depriving rural areas that are already 
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food insecure.62 The Nile Basin will face increased agricultural and irrigation pressure to 
grow this food with negligible development consequences for any countries involved.63  
 
E. The Arab Spring and the Grand Renaissance Dam  
 Despite Egypt’s historical maintenance of the status quo, recent events have 
shaken the regional power dynamic. In 2011, Hosni Mubarak stepped down as the 
Egyptian leader after 30 years following protests. Additionally, the Ethiopian Prime 
Minister Meles Zenawi died in August 2012 after 17 years in office, and the newly 
independent South Sudan hopes to clarify and guarantee its rights pertaining to the 1959 
Agreement. This series of events have raised questions about Egyptian President 
Mohamed Morsi’s ability to maintain the country’s hydro-political hegemony in the Nile 
Basin. 
 Evidence of Egypt’s dwindling power in the region has been detected. Just weeks 
after Mubarak stepped down, the Ethiopians unveiled an aggressive development project 
known as the Grand Renaissance Dam (GRD). This is a part of a long-term national 
effort to spend close to $12 billion by 2035 on development projects on Ethiopia’s 
various rivers to generate an estimated 40,000 megawatts of power.64 The GRD is 
projected to produce 5,250 megawatts of energy, can hold 65 bcm of water and will cost 
an estimated $5 billion. Some economists predict that only 10 percent of the funding has 
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been raised.65 International investors include China and Djibouti, but many international 
investors are wary of supporting the project for fear it would spark further conflict in the 
region. The rest of the funding will be raised through the sale of government bonds and 
taxes raises. This price tag is equivalent to almost the entire budget of the country. This 
has prompted concerns by the IMF that the construction of the GRD will absorb all 
domestic financing.66 However, as one Ethiopian remarked, “We’re going to do this with 
or without you. The Ethiopian government is issuing bonds and the population, all 85 
million of us, are buying bonds in order to chip in to this huge Nile project.67 Ethiopian 
officials have announced that the dam is on track to be completed by 2015 and around 13 
percent of total construction is completed.  
The hydro-electric potential of this dam is enormous and Ethiopia will use the 
power to fuel its own growth and sells the surplus to upstream neighbors. One Ethiopian 
diplomat referred to the dam as “an ATM of hard currency for Ethiopia.”68 Additionally, 
the Dam will create a reservoir almost twice as large as Ethiopia’s largest natural lake, 
Lake Tana, creating enormous irrigation potential.69 The specifics of the dam’s potential 
are still unclear as there have been no published studies on its economic or environmental 
impact. The government has heralded the project for its ability to propel Ethiopia into the 
future and enable them to move beyond their current aid-based economy.70  
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The GRD will cause a significant reduction of the flow of water to downstream 
countries during the period of time when the dam is being filled. It is predicted that it 
could take 2-3 years for this process to occur; estimates depend on annual rainfall.71 
Egypt would experience around a 25 percent reduction in its water flows during this time 
and have no guarantee that they will be able to maintain their present share of water. 72  
 
F. The Egyptian Response 
Egyptian government officials are certain that the completion of the GRD project 
will have dire consequences for the country. Egypt views this project as a direct threat to 
its national security and has transferred responsibility for organizing a response to its 
Interior Ministry. When Ethiopia built a smaller, 580-megawatt hydroelectric dam in 
2010, which had a fraction of the storage capabilities of the proposed GRD, Egypt 
ordered its military to “prepare for any eventuality.”73  
The Egyptian government could respond to this threat in a variety of ways.74 First, 
it could put diplomatic pressure on the Ethiopian government, as any change to Egypt’s 
water flow is technically illegal under the 1959 agreement. The Egyptian government has 
funded a tripartite committee with scientists from Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia to study the 
downstream effects of the dam. If it is proven that their supply will be threatened, 
diplomatic pressure may deter other international lenders from providing the remainder 
of the funding for the GRD for fear of souring relations with the Egyptians. Secondly, the 
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Egyptian government could support proxy military groups to create political instability in 
the Ethiopia. This would likely involve engaging Eritrean rebels who have historically 
become involved in intensifying ethnic grievances within Ethiopia; this would serve to 
unsettle the ethnically divided government.75 Lastly, if the issue becomes ‘securitized,’ 
the government could utilize military force to halt the construction of the dam. This 
would depend on the characteristics of Morsi’s new government, but any large-scale 
reduction would likely be intolerable.76 The likelihood of this response is demonstrated 
by a leaked WikiLeaks document that claims Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir agreed 
to host an Egyptian airbase with the explicit purpose of developing the capability to 
launch a military attack on the dam.77  
No matter Egypt’s response, the construction of the GRD will have profound 
regional implications and directly threaten Egypt’s 5000-year control of the Nile. The 
Arab Spring has created immense monetary volatility and political turmoil in Egypt. The 
Egyptian economy has stalled, the new government has offended former allies and 
protests continue to plague the country. This environment has diminished the 
government’s traditional ability to stonewall financing and diplomatic support for the 
upstream development projects.78 Since the revolution, many decisions have been made 
to upset control and patronage within organizations that have traditionally helped Egypt 
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maintain control.79 Specifically, the military government has upset its long-standing 
relationship with the United States. For example, the government put American 
democracy activists and their Egyptian colleagues on trial for attempting to undermine 
the state.80 The revolutionaries ridiculed at the $3.2 billion aid package from the IMF and 
then backtracked and asked for additional funding.81 Because the United States is the 
biggest stakeholder in both the IMF and the World Bank, this will undoubtedly reduce 
US willingness to block needed development projects for upstream countries to maintain 
Egypt’s status quo with respect to the Nile’s waters. 
 
V. Literature Review 
 In order to understand the regional conflict over the Nile, it is essential to consider 
water-sharing norms, and investigate the international law and theory that dictate riparian 
behavior. Muhammad Rahaman discusses various theories of sovereignty, their relevance 
to international law and ability to manage cross-boundary resource sharing. The theory of 
absolute territorial sovereignty says that nations can utilize waters flowing through their 
territory to their full advantage and have no duty to consult with other riparian states. 
This effectively means that upstream states could utilize all resources without regard to 
downstream need.82 This theory is generally rejected and is not invoked in the creation of 
international water sharing law. The alternative theory of absolute territorial integrity 
states that downstream nations have the right to “the continued and uninterrupted flow of 
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water from the territory of the upper riparian… ‘no matter what the priority.’”83 
Interference to this flow by upstream actors requires the consent of downstream 
countries. For obvious reasons, this theory is often supported by downstream countries; 
however, it also has limited support within the international legal community because it 
places downstream interests ahead of an equitable agreement in the best interest of all 
riparians.  
 Finally, the theory of limited territorial sovereignty states that every nation can 
utilize waters flowing through their territory as long as “utilization does not prejudice the 
rights and interests of co-riparians.”84 This theory is most often used to draft international 
law as it recognizes the equal rights of both upstream and downstream riparians, and 
includes a ‘obligation not to cause significant harm.’85 This theory was invoked in the 
drafting of the Entabbe Treaty signed by upstream riparans as they hoped to develop a 
water-sharing agreement that would equally benefit all involved parties; this would 
replace the existing treaty that allows Egypt to ‘cause significant harm’ to other riparian 
states.  
 Jorg Barandat and Aytul Kaplan argue that access to fresh water is a foremost 
national security issue and that international water law is an inadequate instrument to 
influence the behavior of riparian states because it lacks effective enforcement 
mechanisms to ensure the equitable use of this shared resource.86 The most notable 
international water-sharing standards are outlined in the Helsinki Rules and drafted by the 
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International Law Association in 1966. This framework advocates trans-boundary 
cooperation and equitable sharing to promote social equality, economic growth and 
environmental and ecological protection.87 Specifically, these rules require one riparian to 
inform all other riparian nations of any pending development projects that may harm their 
interests.88 Additionally, the Helsinki Rules advocates the collection and sharing of data 
among all riparians so they may fully understand the externalities of development 
projects; it also calls for reasonable compensation if the interests of the state are 
violated.89 The authors point out that this treaty fails “to sufficiently define the utilization 
or consumption of water, establish binding criteria for equitable utilization, and clearly 
fix priorities with respect different kinds of utilization.”90 While the Helsinki Rules lay 
out an important framework for multilateral negotiations, it requires states to give up their 
absolute territorial sovereignty over a shared water resource which is often outside of 
their national interest. 
 Rainer Durth discusses the conditions under which cooperative solutions between 
riparian countries emerge. He writes, “cooperation will only come about if the riparian 
states are prepared to submit themselves to credible sanctions in the event of 
infringements of treaty obligations.”91 This statement further exploits the inadequacies of 
the Helsinki Rules as states have no incentive to submit ‘to credible sanctions.’ He argues 
that this type of self-regulation will only emerge if there is a mutual dependency between 
states. He points to integrated regions such as the European Union (EU) as an example of 
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a successful mutual dependence. The EU countries have a duty and interest in 
cooperating on issues, such as pollution, that effect their entire region.92 Conversely, this 
cooperation will not emerge if upstream and downstream states have “radically different 
ideas about the fair usage or division of international resources.”93 Without agreed upon 
enforcement mechanisms and self-imposed sanctions, an international legal framework 
based on mutual cooperation will be largely ineffective.  
 John Waterbury further elaborates on the determinants of collective action 
between riparian states.  Waterbury acknowledges that collective action theory is better at 
explaining noncooperation; however he claims that while it is undoubtedly difficult to 
initiate and sustain, collective action is not rare.94 He argues that most international 
treaties are not demanding, compliance is difficult to monitor and there are no credible 
repercussions for defection.95 Therefore, adherence to established treaties “buys observer 
status at a minimum, and access to the data and reporting of other members…[and 
confers] some legitimacy in the eyes of the international community.”96 However, when 
“bottom-line national interests are at stake,” regimes may “throw international legitimacy 
to the winds.”97 He argues that this is the case in the Nile Basin as the “quasi-regime,” 
consisting of Egypt, Sudan and South Sudan, consider the maintenance of the status quo 
to be a matter of national security. Waterbury predicts that any collective agreement will 
be “open to periodic renegotiation and adjustment as the cost-benefit analysis of each of 
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the parties to the regime changes.”98 This inability to create a cooperative water-sharing 
agreement is a direct result of the fact that no mutual dependence can be created; there is 
no community of Nile riparians.99 The Nile states have and will act as unitary actors, and 
there is weak domestic support for the creation of a functional regime encompassing all 
riparian nations. He argues that only rational, interest-based solutions can be applied in 
this scenario and would inevitably require Egypt to harm its long-term interests in the 
name of collective cooperation.100  
 Stefan Deconinck points out that in the absence of a proactive approach by Egypt 
to adopt new policies and address inefficient water usage, this issue may become 
‘securitized;’ this means Egypt will feel compelled to use its military resources to protect 
its control of the Nile. He attempts to dissect the rationale behind countries who “wield 
an official discourse of water scarcity and emergency, while wasting precious amounts of 
water through poor water management.”101 This includes an analysis of the conditions 
under which resource scarcity becomes a security threat for one country while remaining 
a policy issue for another. He argues that this shift occurs when an actor “refers to an 
issue as an existential threat, and tries to convince an audience that extraordinary 
measures must be taken to contain the problem.”102 Without basin-wide cooperation or 
effective preparation for the time when the supply of water is insufficient to meet the 
demand, the Egyptian government could invoke this tactic to protect their historic rights 
and attack Ethiopia’s dam. 
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VI. Hypothetical Cooperative Solutions 
Though highly unlikely, it is interesting to consider a couple of potential regional projects 
that would create a win-win outcome for all actors. First, the region should consider the 
inadequacies of the Aswan High Dam. Lake Nasser is an ‘amazingly inefficient bank’ 
where between 10 and 16 bcm evaporate from its surface; this is more than a quarter of 
the river’s flow in some years.103 British engineers opposed the creation of a giant dam at 
this site for precisely this reason; instead they wanted to build a series of dams upstream 
in the ravines of Ethiopia where the temperature would be cooler and the surface area 
smaller.104 Pearce writes that “it would be expensive, and a major concession for Egypt to 
allow the main faucet on the river to move to another country—particularly its regional 
rival, Ethiopia… [but] it would massively add to the amount of water flowing down the 
Nile.”105 Pearce argues that a single, regulating dam in the most hydro -logically efficient 
location would be a solution to this regional dispute and would leave enough water ‘for 
nature, as well as for the people of the Nile.”106  
Additionally, the region could consider reviving the Jonglei Canal project. In 
1978, The Egyptian and Sudanese governments resurrected an older British project to dig 
the Jonglei Canal through the Sudd swamps in Southern Sudan.107 They dug 260 km of 
the planned 360 km of the canal, but were forced to stop due to intensifying civil war in 
Sudan. The Sudd is a wetland in the middle of the desert that is created by spillage from 
the Nile’s second tributary, the White Nile. This swamp stretches for more than 40,000 
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km and causes the evaporation of almost half of the White Nile’s discharge in the 
process.108 If this project was completed and the water was diverted through the canal 
instead of evaporating in the swamps, an additional 5 bcm will be available to the 
downstream countries. While this solution would allow more water to be taken from the 
Nile by upstream countries without harming Egypt’s allocation, it would have detrimental 
effects on the Sudd’s ecosystem, which supports an enormous and diverse wildlife.  
Despite these regional solutions that could be collectively undertaken, this 
literature review puts the Nile Basin conflict into a theoretical framework which suggests 
that the international water law and norms have historically been ineffective at solving 
conflicts that involve such diverse actors, priorities and goals. These authors present a 
highly pessimistic outlook for collective cooperation by the riparian states; therefore, in 
the interest of regional stability and the avoidance of war, it is necessary to consider a 
policy proposals that will modify current water usage in Egypt and solutions that directly 
relate to a more sustainable utilization of this resource.  
 
VII. Egypt’s Water Policies and Agricultural Inefficiencies 
 It is essential to consider the deteriorating domestic water situation in Egypt, 
which has emerged as a direct result of the government’s unrealistic and inefficient 
policies. In addition to the increasing regional demand for a more equitable water-sharing 
solution, Egypt itself is facing high population growth, rising food prices and dwindling 
agricultural productivity. Though Egypt uses the large majority of the Nile’s waters, it 
per capita water allotment has been falling and is now 800 cubic meters per person which 
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places the population in the category of ‘water scare’ as defined by the United Nations.109 
This is largely due to the fact that only 15-20 per cent of Egypt’s water allotment goes 
towards household consumption. The remaining water is used to irrigate land to grow 
food for the country’s growing population. It is essential to consider both the macro-level 
policy decisions that the Egyptian government is making to deal with this population 
pressure and the related food needs, and the micro-level inefficiencies of the agricultural 
sector including those of the government water bureaucracy. 
 
a. Macro-Level Policy Challenges 
 Despite the increasing controversy over the Nile and the imminent needs of its 
population, the Egyptians are undertaking several development projects that require a 
significant amount of water. Egypt is considering several reclamation schemes, such as 
the New Valley Project, that would redirect a significant portion of its water endowment 
to the Western Desert. The New Valley Project is part of the government’s plan to deal 
with population growth in Egypt. Around 95 percent of Egypt’s population lives in the 
Nile Delta and the river valley.110 Egypt plans to divert between 5 and 10 bcm from the 
AHD to the Western Desert to irrigate this land to move people to areas with low-
population density and grow additional food. When the project is finished, between 
300,000 and 500,000 additional hectares will be irrigated.111  
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 The question is, given the fact that only 0.5 bcm of the Nile’s water reaches the 
Mediterranean and the rest is used within Egyptian borders, where will the additional 
water for the New Valley Project come from? The government claims that they will not 
overdraw from its Nile allotment but instead will find the water by “use existing water 
supplies more efficiently, fostering water conservation efforts, abstracting ground water, 
using reclaimed wastewater and shifting out of the sugar cane and rice to less water-
intensive crops.”112 Yohannes points out that “the diversion of 5.5 bcm of Nile water to 
the western desert casts a shadow on the elites’ commitment to efficiency.”113 While 
these conservation efforts need to be considered in  the grand scheme of things, these 
water-savings will be needed to make up for shortages when Ethiopia completes 
construction of the GRD and cannot be used to irrigate hyper-arid desert land. Egypt’s 
allotment of water as outlined by the 1959 Agreement is contingent upon minimal water 
use by upstream countries. It would be very difficult, if not impossible, to irrigate this 
additional land and provide for its growing population even with savings from improved 
efficiency. This New Valley project, and the use of valuable water to grow food in an 
area that is hyper-arid, is not an economically rational decision for Egypt.  
The New Valley Project is only one of the development factors stressing Egypt’s 
water resources. Suburban development in and around Cairo is also utilizing enormous 
amounts of water to accommodate the lifestyles of the city’s elite at the expense of the 
poor. In 2004, despite the government’s inability to create an effective pricing system to 
control the agricultural and irrigation sectors, it sought to experiment with a water-pricing 
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scheme in Cairo. It began to privatize its urban water facilities in order to increase 
efficiency; this reform forced water utility companies to operate at a profit, which 
resulted in the water price doubling in some areas of the city. The majority of this water 
has been diverted from small fishing and farming villages that cannot afford to pay the 
city’s high prices. This has forced many residents of Cairo, where around 40 percent live 
on less than $2 a day, to get water from the dirty Nile canals.114  An analysis of the city’s 
water supply by a local NGO found that 75 percent of the samples distributed in the low 
income area of Manshiyat Naser, or Garbage City, did not meet the minimum standards 
for drinking water as outlined by the city.115 Tens of thousands of Egyptians protested 
water shortages this summer (2012) and claim that they are suffering from environmental 
bias; this is shown “towards cities over villages, coastal areas over southern ones, and 
rich ones over the poor.”116  
 
b. Characteristics of Egypt’s Agricultural and Irrigation Sectors 
 Egypt’s agriculture and irrigation sectors are currently wracked with 
inefficiencies and are entirely unequipped to handle a future reduction in water. Already, 
both Egypt’s ground water and surface water resources are fully exploited.117 Egypt’s 
agriculture sector utilizes 80-85 percent of the water from the AHD; however, the 
industry only accounts for 20 percent of the country’s GDP and 30 percent of the 
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workforce.118 The efficiency of water use within the agriculture sector is measured at 
between 60 and 70 percent.119 This percentage drops significantly if only irrigation 
methods are analyzed. By some estimates, only 2 percent of Egypt’s 3.2 million hectares 
used for agriculture are irrigated by efficient methods.120 As Okbazghi Yohannes 
explains, “if efforts to improve demand side management, conservation, and the efficient 
use of water are not supported, the consequences could be dire.”121  
The majority of Egypt’s agricultural sector has high crop yield per unit of land 
and high cropping intensity in comparison to country averages; this is due to its favorable 
climate for many species including tomatoes, potatoes, grapes and strawberries.122 
Merrey points out that, “maintaining the high cropping intensity and increasing the value 
of agricultural output will be impossible if water supplies are stretched too thinly, and 
become unreliable.”123 Currently, only 3.5 percent of Egypt’s land mass, mainly in the 
Nile’s Delta, is being utilized as agricultural land.124 The government has invested 
heavily in expanding the amount of irrigated land since the completion of the AHD to 
reduce population density in the Basin and grow additional food. This is exemplified by 
the New Valley project and other land reclamation projects. The current rate of 
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reclamation is around 37,000 hectares a year and requires a substantial amount of Egypt’s 
current water allotment.125  
The irrigation system is a complex system of channels that lead from the AHD to 
the most rural villages. (Figure 2)126 Water is released from the AHD into a single 
irrigation tunnel that features seven barrages, or large gates, that control water flow into 
the canal branches; this water flow is continuous. The most significant barrage is directly 
after Cairo and release water into to the Rosetta and Damietta branches which carry water 
to various areas of the Delta. From these branches, water is siphoned into distributaries, 
or mesquas, according to a rotation schedule -- not a continuous flow. The water from the 
mesquas is manually pumped from the canals to irrigate nearby fields.127 
 
c. The MPWWR and its Excessive Bureaucracy 
In order to maintain the productivity of the sector given the substantial 
competition for the Nile’s resources, there must be efforts to increase efficiency and 
maintain productivity. The current government agency that manages Egypt’s water 
resources, the Ministry of Public Works and Water Resource (MPWWR), treats Egypt’s 
water as if it is unlimited. Its current policies are only contributing to water scarcity and 
there is a need for institutional reform.128  Merrey refers to greater efficiency within the 
organization prior to the construction of the AHD as the organization had to manage both 
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flood and drought crises.129 After the completion of the dam, the MPWWR had a water 
surplus in most years which deteriorated its incentive to maintain an efficient irrigation 
system. Its efficiency dropped further in the late-1980s when the government shifted 
from a policy of controlling crop patterns to a policy that allows the ‘market’ to drive 
demand for certain crops – without charging for water. 130 Due to these loose regulations, 
many Egyptian farmers’ now grow cash crops such as sugarcane and rice whose growth 
is highly water-intensive. The MPWWR has failed to adapt its policies to reflect the 
country’s growing population, soaring food prices and the fact that its share of the Nile is 
under threat. The Ministry needs to alter its institutional objectives and governing 
policies to reflect the fact that the country is now moving towards a period of water 
scarcity. Primarily, this will involve reforms to improve cost recovery, accountability, 
water quality and distribution, etc. in order to create an institution capable of dealing with 
the impending crisis. 
The MPWWR has a full-time staff of more than 88,000 employees, with the 
Irrigation Department being the largest; its responsibilities are diverse and extensive. The 
Ministry is in charge of policy-making, construction and design for civil works projects, 
maintenance and operation of water distribution and drainage from the AHD, coastal 
protection, etc.131 The MPWWR is highly centralized. Merrey points out that “authority 
is held mostly at higher levels and there is little participation of lower-levels in decision-
making; and there is little accountability of higher to lower levels, or the organization to 
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its customers.”132  There is a general reluctance to delegate authority from the top-tier of 
the organization due to engrained systems of patronage and a lack of operational 
protocol.133  
This top-down system has resulted in private interests, specifically those of large 
landowners, being represented and prioritized within the organization.134 It has been 
reported that under the Mubarak regime, small-scale farmers were forcibly evicted from 
their land so that political elites could settle and develop there.135Those that are wealthy 
and have political connections had few complaints about dependability in the system.  
This is reflected by the results of survey in which small-scale farmers in middle Egypt 
and the Delta ranked ‘absolute water shortage’ as their most pressing problem while 
larger farmers had few complaints about consistency in their water supply.136 Local 
farmers, as Radwan argues, “have been divested of any meaningful control over the 
patterns of [water] supply with the result that cooperation…has been replaced by a large 
degree of individualism, as farmers limit their attention to their own specific needs in a 
local context.”137 There is high variability in the water supply to the small-scale, 
fragmented farms in Egypt’s rural areas which have caused prevalent reports of over-
pumping and the premature depletion of the canals when there is water. This inequality in 
distribution has forced rural farmers to account for future shortages thereby taking more 
than their share of the resource and harming their downstream neighbors; there have also 
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been reports of farmers using untreated sewage to rescue their crops which poses 
enormous health risks to the community and livestock.138 
 
d. Failure of Informational Linkages 
As Merrey points out, “there is no information on how much water is delivered to 
specific areas and no capacity to measure and allocate specified amount of water. There 
is no clear sense of water rights… no basis for establishing and enforcing such rights, and 
no clear priorities for water use.”139 The MPWWR accepts that there is a high margin of 
error in their calculation of national water requirements and in the past, it has embraced a 
policy that releases water in the canals in far excess of their estimates.140 However, as 
illustrated, this surplus discharge from the AHD still creates shortages in certain areas. 
The water released from the AHD into the canal system is largely unregulated and the 
government has no knowledge of how this water is distributed into the lower-level or 
distributaries canals. Additionally, surplus water flowing into sparsely populated canal 
routes flows into escape structures and enters the drainage system.141 The waste from the 
canals is supposed to be regulated by MPWWR water guards, or bahhar, who are 
required to visit all sections of the canals on a daily basis. In reality. the guards rarely 
visit the canal ends and fail to consistently measure water levels.142 Due to this 
ineffective management, much water remains unused and some valuable water is 
siphoned into the Mediterranean. The bahhar is supposed to act as the liaison between 
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the farmers and the MPWWR; however, the delegation of power to the local level has 
failed due to weak linkages between the various levels of the organization. This systemic 
breakdown has created informational shortages, which has resulted in significant water 
waste.  
 
e. Supply and Demand Allocation Inefficiencies 
The inequality and unreliability in the irrigation system is exacerbated by the 
inefficient mechanisms for determining water demand; the calculated need has become 
increasingly unrealistic as the government relies on the likely cropping pattern at the 
beginning of each season, previous growth volume and other outdated data.143 Attempts 
to average a nationwide community ‘quota’ without specific information has been be 
extremely inaccurate due to varying conditions across rural areas such as the quality of 
the irrigation infrastructure, crop type, climate, etc.  For example, in the village of 
Yaquat, the cropping patterns submitted to the government did not accurately reflect the 
true needs of the community. The land area was overestimated by 5 percent due to a 
failure to update land records either due to negligence or corruption.144 Once these 
inaccuracies are calculated at the national level, there is an enormous amount of 
inefficiency and waste in the water allocation system which leads to an abundance of 
water in some areas and deficiencies in other areas.  
There have been diverse community-based responses to deal with the variability 
in supply. The situation varies across the country depending on whether the community is 
                                                          
143
 Merrey,"Governances and Institutional Arrangements for Managing Water Resources in Egypt," 2. 
144
 Radwan, "Farmer's Responses to Inefficiencies in the Supply and Distribution of Irrigation Water 
Requirements in Delta Egypt," 48. 
37 
 
receiving a surplus of water or facing shortages.  Those facing shortages can appeal to the 
bahhar to request additional water; however, in many cases these requests are refused 
based on the assumption that they are unjustified.145 In reality, these local agents of the 
MPWWR have little authority to increase discharge and do not want to become involved 
in a direct confrontation with their superiors.146 In the rare case that these demands reach 
higher levels of the organization, usually due to the influence of a bribe, any resulting 
increase is usually short-term.147 The failure of the government to solve these problem 
forces individuals to utilize informal methods to ensure their water supply; these 
techniques often have harmful effects of their neighbors and community at large. In rural 
areas, water is released on a rotational schedule meaning that it comes once every 10-15 
days if it arrives on schedule.148 One resident of rural Abu Sir explains, “each small canal 
has to pass through a series of villages, and because of the water scare, everyone is taking 
more. So, by the time it gets to the end of the canal, it’s drained.”149 Therefore, farmers 
will often water ahead of requirements when there is a surplus of water in their canal. 
Additionally, some water users take precautionary measures and engage in the practice of 
‘damming,’ meaning that upstream farmers block-off the mesqua immediately before the 
inlet to their fields to get a buildup of water. Damming blocks access to the canals for 
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users father downstream and often creates community-wide conflict regarding fair 
allocation of their limited resources.150   
 
f. Water as a Public Good 
The federal government provides water without any charge to local farmers. In 
most rural areas, irrigation water is free but farmers have to pay monthly fees for the 
maintenance and running of the pumps that bring water out of the mesquas.151 The only 
limiting incentive on the amount of usable water is the effort of pumping water from the 
canal to the fields and, of course, the availability of the water. Given these factors and the 
political unpopularity for a water-pricing system in Egypt, the current cost recovery 
system is extremely ineffective. Additionally, there is high concern regarding water 
quality in the country. While there are laws that govern pollution levels, the enforcement 
of these standards have been sub-par. Dumping garbage in the irrigation canals has 
become common in rural areas due to a lack of waste management facilities; when water 
flow is low, the garbage accumulates and poses significant health risks to the crops and 
the community.152 
 
g. Implications 
This lack of accountability to the public, inefficiency and excessive bureaucracy 
is characteristic of many of the Egypt’s governing organizations. Merrey predicts that 
changing “old, large organizations, with their long traditions, large numbers, and political 
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power of their vested interests, and their critical… [importance] to the economy will not 
be an easy job and will not be accomplished in a short period.”153  Efficiency can only be 
achieved if there is accurate, community specific data regarding seasonal cropping 
patterns in each area, delivery efficiency, water quality, etc. This information can only be 
collected with the cooperation of the local farmers who feel that they will gain, not lose 
precious water, by complying.154 This lack of regulation, community-specific knowledge, 
and the inefficient management of the lower canal system has resulted in excessive water 
allocated to certain areas of the country while others are extremely water deprived. If 
management at the national level cannot be reformed, there must be a re-delegation of 
power, likely to a community-based water distribution system 
 
VIII. Mexican Irrigation Reform 
Given the systemic inefficiencies in the Egyptian institution that govern the 
nation’s scare water resources and the concern over the likelihood of improvement, it is 
necessary to look at the strategies undertaken by the Mexican government to delegate 
power away from the federal level and reforms its water resource allocation system.  This 
endeavor by Mexico began in the mid-eighties and was driven more by budgetary 
pressures exacerbated by economic crisis within the country than a shortage of water or 
food supplies. Mexico implemented successful irrigation reform based on the use of 
Water User Associations (WUAs). While the driving factor behind irrigation reform 
differs between Egypt and Mexico, many of the characteristics of the Mexican water 
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sector prior to reform align with the current situation in Egypt. Primarily, the Mexican 
institution governing the water sector, The Mexican Ministry of Agriculture and Water 
Resources (MAWR), was awash with bureaucratic excess, similar to the Egyptian 
MPWWR. As part of the reform effort, the government reduced the amount of 
government officials in the sector 40,000 to 4,000.155 Additionally, the Mexican water 
sector was characterized by an excessive amount of government subsidies in order to 
meet demand without effectively charging farmers for water use. Mexico’s water 
operation and management costs were extremely high, and its cost recovery system was 
negligible leading to an immense financial burden on the government. This burden is 
similarly felt by the Egyptian government due to their policy of ‘meeting’ water demand 
without charging users. One Mexican government official remarked “at the beginning 
[the MAWR] thought the machines the most important, the office, the infrastructure, the 
canals and the dams, but now they think water is the most valuable resource they 
control”156 Additionally, the Mexican government faced immense degradation in its canal 
infrastructure and drainage systems which is also prevalent in much of Egyptian rural 
areas.  
While there are marked difference between the two countries and their respective 
crises, aspects of the Mexican strategy can be utilized in Egypt to begin to address this 
‘creeping crisis.’157 Historically, the Mexican irrigation system was characterized by high 
levels of government subsidies for all farmers belonging to cooperatives in irrigation 
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districts. Cummings and Nercissiantz point out that this meant “with few exceptions… 
farmers have never been required to repay capital costs association with water… 
moreover, for long periods of time, [operation and management] costs were heavily 
subsidized by the government.”158 These inefficiencies created immense budgetary 
pressure on the MAWR. Rap explains that “public management of irrigation districts led 
to poor irrigation performance and decreasing levels of productivity, because the 
government bureaucracy lacked the incentives and responsiveness to optimize 
management performance.”159 The administration sought to transfer management to the 
local level. The government wanted users to participate in this restructuring so that 
effective incentives would exist to improve efficiency and lower costs.160 
 Beginning in 1989, the country embraced a series of neoliberal policies to 
radically reform its water management system by transferring control of their irrigation 
sector to WUAs. The Mexican government created the Comision Nacional del Aqua 
(CONAGUA), an organization whose sole purpose was to oversee the transfer of water 
authority from the MAWR to WUAs. Under the reform, MAWR was merged with 
CONAGUA; at the highest level, CONAGUA would be responsible for “establishing 
policies, norms, [and] standards, approving and supervising plans and annual budgets… 
[and] supervision, monitoring and evaluation of all activities at the national and basin 
levels.”161 CONAGUA divided the country’s agricultural lands into modules that had 
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clearly defined boundaries and could operate as autonomous organizations.162 Each 
module was to become financially independent and develop a staff not administratively 
reliant on CONAGUA’s jurisdiction. The leadership of the WUAs would be chosen 
directly by the users and the WUA as an organization would be financially dependent on 
the users. This created an incentive structure to reduce the costs of water management 
from both the user and administrative perspectives. The users would choose 
administrators that could most effectively reduce costs.163 This system significantly 
strengthened property rights to water and provided users with clear roles and 
responsibilities. The WUAs now operate the majority of Mexico’s canals and 
CONAGUA maintains only the head structures of the system including dams and 
multiuse canals.164 The WUAs have improved operation and maintenance costs, and 
achieved financial autonomy and administrative self-sufficiency.165 Today, 452 WUAs 
comprising of 506,000 water users manage total land of 3.3 million hectares.166 
Interestingly, both the population of Mexico and agricultural land under development at 
the time of reform are not dissimilar from those of Egypt. 
The rapid implementation of these reforms by the Mexican government and the 
ensuing success of its policies have been heralded by the international community as an 
example for other countries to emulate to cut costs and improve the performance of their 
irrigation sector.167 Rap points out that the replication of this type of model requires 
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strong government commitment at the highest level supplemented by ‘champions’ of 
reform who can mobilize support within the legislative bodies.168 Additionally, the 
effectiveness of WUAs is grounded in an effective legal framework with defined 
ownership of water resources and strong property rights protection.169 The cornerstone of 
success is the financial self-sufficiency of the WUAs; in Mexico, the water users pay a 
fee to the WUA prior to receiving the water to ensure the longevity of the organization.170 
This has resulted in more than 90 percent of users paying their assessed charges.171 
 
IX. Egypt’s Irrigation Improvement Program 
In 1996, the Egyptian government experimented with the implementation of 
WUAs through a series of pilot programs in select rural areas to test the feasibility of a 
shift towards community management of water resources. This project was called the 
Irrigation Improvement Program (IIP) and was a joint venture between USAID and 
MPWWR It is essential to compare this program to the strategies undertaken by the 
Mexican government. While the IIP programs were only implemented in a few villages, 
the outcome of these policies highlight essential areas that need to be modified before a 
nationwide shift to WUA control can be successful. 
A primary goal of the IIP effort was to “increase MPWWR knowledge and 
capabilities to analyze and formulate strategies, policies and plans related to integrated 
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water supply augmentation, conservation and utilization.”172 Unlike in the Mexican case 
where the majority of power was delegated to the local level, the IPP effort did not seek 
to abolish the MPWWR, but sought to strengthen its institutional capacity; as discussed 
above, efforts to change such a large, historic organization are extremely difficult.173 
In Egypt, the main duties of the WUAs would include “scheduling of water 
delivery on mesquas, perform maintenance and resolve disputes, [and] increase 
communication links between farmers and government officials.”174 A new branch of the 
MPWWR called the Irrigation Advisory Service (IAS) would oversee the WUAs. While 
literature on the IIP effort alludes to a grand devolution of power to the WUAs, the local 
responsibilities have essentially stayed the same. The problem still lies in the 
unresponsiveness of the MPWWR to the local demands of the farmers. The effectiveness 
of the Mexican WUA system lays in their distributional and financial autonomy. One of 
the keys to the Mexican success is the effectiveness of CONAGUA at ensuring that the 
national and local governments work together. The Mexicans effectively eliminated the 
power of the MAWR and consolidated its institutional responsibilities in CONAGUA, 
giving it a largely advisory role. A joint report between the MPWWR and USAID 
evaluating the administrative capability of the IIP expresses doubts about the ability of 
the government to provide sufficient staff to educate farmers about efficient water 
management practices; initial IIP reports showed inadequate staffing levels and high 
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turnover rates.175 The paper states that this effort “must be supported and championed at a 
high level within the responsible governing agency.”176 However, the MPWWR has not 
fundamentally changed as an organization to make it better suited to manage these 
essential aspects of the irrigation sector; it still retains the power structures that have 
proven to be costly and ineffective at gathering information, delegating water 
appropriately, and monitoring the quality, flow and waste of the water. A similar 
devolution of power from the MPWWR to the IAS, similar to the Mexican case, should 
be considered. 
Furthermore, the IIP effort sought to implement policies that would recover ‘a 
portion’ of governmental costs of operation and maintenance of the irrigation system, and 
also cover 100 percent of costs for mesqua upkeep.177The USAID and MPWWR report 
points to several market failure considerations that could thwart the success of this cost 
recovery effort. These include lack of farmer knowledge and awareness of the IIP 
program, high transaction costs, lack of credit and property rights issues.178 It is estimated 
that the implementation of the IIP effort costs approximately $1092/hectare of land with 
the majority of the costs emanating from necessary mesqua improvements. Without a 
clear delegation of property rights to the local level and an assurance that reliability will 
be improved, these poor, rural farmers have no incentive to pay for these improvements. 
Because leadership at the local level is still responsible to the MPWWR through the IAS 
teams, there is no incentive to become financially autonomous when the government can 
still be relied upon to absorb some local costs.  
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The IIP effort also included components of physical change.  The IIP advocated a 
continuous flow in the branch and distributaries canals; previously only principal and 
main canals ran continuously and other branches ran on a rotational basis.179 This was an 
attempt to address complaints of inadequate, unreliable, and uneven distribution of water 
through the canal system. Where this IIP- advocated continuous flow was implemented, 
all communities faced water shortages at the expense of the few under the pilot program. 
This was due to the fact that the MPWWR staff did not initially understand the hydraulic 
capabilities needed to maintain continuous flow, which were not adequate in many of the 
canal branches.180 However, those participating in the IIP pilot programs experienced a 
marked increase in reliability. Hvidt reports that within the IIP program, “the presence of 
a well-functioning continuous flow regime in the branch canals was the single most 
important factors contributing to security of water control at farm level.”181 If these 
infrastructure improvements can be made on a nationwide level, continuous flow 
irrigation would significantly improve reliability in the water delivery services. However, 
this is a very expensive undertaking. As the USAID and MPWWR reports concludes, 
“even though farm level benefits of the IIP may appear attractive, farmers have little 
chance of realizing these benefits without concurrent MPWWR action to improve the 
main system and provide better irrigation delivery service.”182 While improvements have 
been reported in the areas of water reliability and equitable distribution of the resource in 
the pilot areas with continuous flow, WUAs cannot fully embrace their responsibility for 
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the operation and maintenance of the canal system until infrastructure improvement 
occurs.  
While the continuous flow aspect of the WUAs did improve demand-side access 
to water in pilot areas, Martin Hvidt identifies several areas where continuous flow could 
be harmed by the bureaucratic tendencies of the MPWWR.  Implementing the continuous 
flow aspect of the IIP on a national scale would be extremely expensive as it requires 
substantial changes to the existing infrastructure such as the introduction of automatic 
gates. If this updated infrastructure were not implemented rapidly, which is likely given 
the ineffectiveness of the organization, there would be a preferential allocation of water 
to branch canals that could support the flow.183 The IIP effort found that there is a marked 
lack of expertise among construction contracts able to work on the canal infrastructure, 
making the cost of improvement very high with contracts frequently running their allotted 
time by over by a year or more.184   During summer months when water is more scare, the 
MPWWR employees in charge of allocation may be influenced by large and influential 
farmers who “are very outspoken when it comes to obtaining their allocated share – and 
if possible a larger share – of the available water.”185 This is especially relevant given the 
organization’s tendency to engage in patronage. If the engineer in charge of 
implementing the continuous flow is coerced by these powerful farmers, then other canal 
branches will receive less water. Due to a lack of administrative supervision within 
MPWWR, the gate keepers have significant amounts of freedom when deciding how to 
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allocate the water and can often earn supplemental income by accepting bribes.186  Given 
the corrupt tendencies of the MPWWR and its lack of regulation of its low level staff 
members, the progress achieved through these IIP pilot programs are in danger of being 
nullified due to the inadequacies of this organization. This administrative corruption 
would be irrelevant if this power were awarded to WUAs with supervision by an 
independent IAS and run by community members with an incentive to equitably allocate 
water. 
This prototype has been referred to as “revolutionary in the Egyptian context” for 
its potential to increase crop yield, reduce the time needed to irrigate one hectare, and 
decrease labor costs; however, it has been demonstrated that these efforts are 
inadequate.187 It is helpful to consider modifications that can be made to these pilot 
programs to make WUAs more effective as they are not impossible to overcome. It is 
also beneficial to briefly look at other aspects of Egypt’s irrigation and agricultural 
systems that can be improved on a more macro level.  
 
X. Policy Considerations 
a. Macro- Level Improvements 
i. Abandon Reclamation Programs 
It cannot be the policy of the Egyptian government to promote the irrigation of 
desert land to grow food and create incentives for relocation to reduce population density 
in the Nile Basin. While the Nile Delta is a highly productive agricultural region, the 
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Sinai Peninsula and the southern desert do not possess inherently fertile soils.188 The New 
Valley project alone is expected to claim as much as 5 bcm per year of the Nile’s water 
and will require between $60-90 billion to support agriculture, industry and tourism in the 
region over the next 20-30 years.189 Academics are asking serious questions about 
whether these projects will “increase or decrease the net social benefits generated with 
Nile River water” as it has been proven that water is more productive and delivery costs 
are much cheaper in the Nile Delta than the Sinai Peninsula.190 Wichelns conducts a 
regression analysis to determine which land produces the largest economic return for its 
share of the Nile. He argues that an cost-benefit analysis of these reclamation projects 
must include competing demands for limited capital and water, and Egypt’s growing 
unemployment problem.191 He concludes that “public and private investments in new 
production and processing activities in the Nile Valley and Delta may generate net social 
benefits more quickly and in greater magnitude than projects in the northern Sinai and 
southern desert.”192 Therefore, the Egyptian government must refrain from purposely 
diverting precious water to sub-optimal agriculture areas; instead they should consider 
other methods of attaining food security such as improved use of water and selection of 
crops, and should mechanisms for reducing population growth and density such as family 
planning or increased birth control access. Waterbury suggests an alternative solution. He 
argues that a more logical solution for Egypt is an increase in its import of grain. He 
explains that Egypt is the riparian state that is in the best position to pursue this option to 
                                                          
188
 Wichelns, Dennis. "Economic Analysis of Water Allocation Policies Regarding Nile River Water in 
Egypt." Argicultural Water Managament 52.2 (2002): 155-175. Print, 157. 
189
 Ibid. 
190
 Ibid, 156. 
191
 Ibid, 172-173 
192
 Ibid. 
50 
 
increase food security given their “stronger, more diversified economy and better 
infrastructure.”193 The country already imports 60 percent of its food and international 
food prices rose 37 percent from 2008 to 2010; however, trade-based solutions must be 
considered as the country’s poorest are feeling the effects of this price increases, and the 
inevitable decrease in the volume of subsidized food.194 
 
ii. Strengthen Informational Linkages Between Local Users and Government 
 The last national census of agricultural activity was completed in 1961. The exact 
area of unused arable and cultivated land is unknown. An effective system to determine 
community water systems does not exist. Given Egypt’s limited water resources, this type 
of informational gap is unacceptable. The government must be able to identify the land 
and crops that are most suitable for a specific area, and provide incentives for farmers to 
heed its advice. Additionally, a priority system must be established for allocation to the 
various communities, and water quality standards must be implemented and maintained 
to prevent the excessive pollution of canals. This type of information will require 
cooperation between the federal government and the local WUAs to gather information 
on cropping patterns and determine whether these current allocations are sustainable and 
efficient. 
iii. Methods to Increase Nile Discharge 
As discussed above, if collective action between the riparian states can be achieved, it is 
important to consider the additional discharge that can be utilized through joint 
development projects. Primarily, the feasibility of the Jonglei Canal project should be 
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reassessed and less arid locations should be considered as alternative to the Aswan High 
Dam. 
 
b. Micro-Level Improvements 
i. Reduced Role of MPWWE and Further Autonomy to the WUAs 
Egypt must follow in Mexico’s footsteps and significantly reduce the role and 
power of the MPWWE in water allocation. Although the MPWWE could be especially 
effective at gathering information from various communities to develop nation-wide 
strategies, local leaders within the WUAs should be responsible for the equitable 
allocation of water to various canals. If local community members are forced to continue 
consulting with the MPWWE over shortages, quality, pricing, etc., there is no 
accountability. If there is distributional autonomy, the WUA has incentives to modify its 
behavior as there is transparency and accountability at the local level. As Mahmoud 
Moustafa points out, “instead of rights to property, [the Egyptian] government… [is] 
trying to transfer responsibility for the property, while retaining fundamental ownership 
rights.”195 The strengthening of local property rights within WUAs, as exemplified by the 
Mexican case, is essential to create incentives for farmers to manage their allocation of 
water responsibly and invest in the expensive infrastructure improvements necessary to 
implement continuous flow. If the government could gather enough information about the 
water need of each area and divide communities into clearly defined units, it could 
provide each area with a specific quota of water based on need and as a percentage of a 
sustainable national usage. The community would have clear and undeniable property 
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rights to this amount of water. It would then be up to the local community to devise a 
system of distribution, perhaps based on historic productivity, plot size or general need, 
and levy fees for this water. This money would cover the operating costs of the local 
organization and pay for the maintenance of the local infrastructure. The government 
would have to ensure that the proper legal framework exists to settle disputes and ensure 
the strength of these property rights.  Given the similarities between the two countries in 
terms of demographics, cultivated lands and characteristics of the irrigation systems, 
Egypt should be able to implement reforms with similar success to Mexico.  
ii. What is Water Worth? 
As of now, irrigation water is largely managed as a free resource with guaranteed 
access rights which has led to inefficient water allocation and practices. There is currently 
disequilibrium between supply and demand, and government subsidization significantly 
contributes to over use. It is essential for Egypt to treat water as an economic good with, 
as Doss and Milne point out, “prices based on supply and demand rather than a 
subsidized administered price or, no price at all.”196 Water allocation and pricing must 
reflect the scarcity of the good in order to address supply problems.  It is necessary for 
the WUAs to estimate the value of water, the opportunity cost of its depletion, and the 
operation and management costs incurred; this price can be reflected in the price charged 
to the residents.197 This economic analysis must be conducted in conjunction with the 
national government. If water can be priced and allocated through a private market, then 
inefficient use at the local level will be greatly reduced. 
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Additionally, an effective market and price for water will decrease the likelihood 
of farmers growing water-intensive crops. Based on national averages, the production of 
rice, sugar cane and fruits, which are grown abundantly in Egypt, have the three highest 
water consumption figures per hectare of crops.198 After Egypt altered its planned 
agriculture sector in favor of a more liberal decision-making process, many cotton and 
maize farmers switched to rice production for its higher profitability; this resulted in 
amount of land used for rice production doubling. Doss and Milne show that the 
irrigation of more than approximately 500,000 hectares of rice would use 20 percent of 
Egypt’s Nile water.199 For both the purposes of decreasing water usage and increasing 
food security, the continued use of water to grow these water-intensive species is 
unsustainable and does not maximize land productivity. If a water pricing and quota 
system were implemented, it is likely that farmers will shift away from these species 
because they will be unable to afford the water to maintain them. However, if this 
reduction is not sufficient, the government may have to return to centrally-planned 
agricultural quotas and restrictions. 
iii. Invest in Modernizing Canal Infrastructure  
In order to replicate the continuous flow mechanism which is essential to the 
success of the IIP effort, there must be a series of improvements to the canal 
infrastructure. This will include the installation of automatic downstream control gates to 
correctly allocate water from the AHD to various canals. Additionally, as Hvidt explains, 
a significant majority of the current canals must be “redug and downsized, improvements 
in earthwork must be undertaken and all new mesqua intakes must be reconstructed and 
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aligned on a standard level.”200While this will inevitably be an expensive undertaking, the 
development of uniform canal infrastructure is essential to the long-term reliability and 
sustainability of the irrigation sector. Because the government cannot be relied upon to 
rapidly and effectively implement these reforms, it is suggested that the IIP should only 
work “to plan and facilitate” these efforts and the WUAs should work directly with local, 
private firms to organize the design and construction of the mesqua improvements.201 
This can paid for, in part, by the fees levied at the local level; however, as discussed, the 
success of raising local funds is dependent on the strengthening of property rights. An 
effective and modern regulatory system within the canals can significantly reduce 
wastage and will allow the government to efficiently manage and monitor output from 
the AHD. 
 
XI. Conclusion 
The countries of the Nile Basin are on a collision course that could result in 
disastrous military action to determine control. In the wake of the Arab Spring, the 
Egyptian government has lost much of the regional clout that allowed it to maintain its 
enormous share of the Nile as outlined by the 1959 agreement. Population and economic 
growth in upstream countries, specifically Ethiopia, have resulted in intensified calls for a 
more equitable water-sharing agreement. However, any water taken by upstream 
countries would be a direct reduction in Egypt’s allocation. A 13- year stalemate in the 
NBI prompted Ethiopia to begin building the GRD without Egypt’s consent. This dam 
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will provide Ethiopia with enormous hydroelectric and irrigation power; however, the 
completion of this dam will also result in a certain reduction of the water that reaches 
Egypt’s borders. Egypt’s population and agriculture sector rely heavily on the 
maintenance of this status quo and also the face the mounting effects of climate change, 
rising food prices and immense population growth.  
In order to avoid a severe water crisis, Egypt must look to improve efficiency 
within its own borders. Primarily this will involve the devolution of power to the local 
level through the implementation of WUAs. However, the IIP pilot program that Egypt 
implemented did not establish a framework that could plausibly result in the necessary 
water-savings. This is due to its failure to reduce the power of the MPWWR and delegate 
enough power to the community level the WUAs; the pilot program failed to create 
distributional and financial autonomy within the WUAs and they lacked proper 
community-wide incentives to reduce water usage.  It is essential to take examples from 
the successful Mexican irrigation reform efforts and combine these with other 
modifications and policy shifts with the agriculture and irrigation sectors in to save 
enough water to provide for the growing population in Egypt; these efforts may avoid 
shortages when the GRD and other upstream development projects are completed. 
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